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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
ST.\TE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vs-

Case No. 10065

JAMES EDWARD BRYAN,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
ST.-\TEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE
The appellant, James Edward Bryan, has appealed from
his conviction of the crime of automobile homicide in violation of Section 76-30-7.4, Utah Code Annotated 1953,
after jury trial in the Third Judicial District, Salt Lake
County.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
By information filed by the District Attorney, Third
Judicial District, the appellant was charged with crime of
automobile homicide. Trial was had upon the charges on
September 16-18, 1963, upon a jury trial with the Honorable Ray VanCott, Judge, presiding. The jury returned a
verdict of guilty of the crime as charged and notice of
appeal was filed on the 14th day of November, 1963.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent, State of Utah, submits that the appellant's
conviction should be affirmed by this court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The appellant submits the following statement of facts
as being those relevant and material to the only issue raised
on appeal.
On June 1, 1963, the appellant, operating a 1960 red
Chevrolet automobile, drove the vehicle into the rear of
a flatbed truck at 3965 South State Street in Salt Lake
County at approximately 11:05 p.m. The appellant was
the driver of the vehicle and his wife and two other persons
were passengers in the vehicle ( R. 57, 58) . The appellant's
wife and the two passengers died as a result of the collision.
The appellant was charged with having killed Charles William Studham ( R. 1 ) , a passenger in the vehicle.
Deputy Sheriff Pete Kutulas arrived at the accident
scene about 11 : 06 p.m. ( R. 57) . The appellant was sitting
outside his car on the curb ( R. 58) . The officer examined
the passengers and indicated that the female passenger in
the front seat appeared to be dead (R. 58). The impact of
the collision of the appellant's car with the flatbed truck
caused the latter vehicle to strike a third car owned by a
Mr. Bermer (R. 59). There were no injuries to persons in
the Bermer vehicle. Officer Kutulas found a whiskey bottle
in the appellant's vehicle and arranged to have the appellant taken to the hospital (R. 72). Officer Gary Steinfeldt,
also a deputy sheriff, arrived at the scene of the accident at
approximately the same time as Officer Kutulas. He observed the appellant sitting on the curb with his head in a
handkerchief (R. 212). At one point the appellant attempted to stand, and fell down again. Officer Steinfeldt
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asked the appellant if he were injured, and the appellant replied that he was drunk ( R. 213). Officer Steinfeldt indicated there was a strong odor of alcohol on the appellant's
breath (R. 234). Officer Kutulas, who saw the appellant
at the Salt Lake County Hospital, also detected a heavy
odor of alcohol and was of the opinion that he was drunk
(R. 7'2, 74).
While the appellant was at the Salt Lake County Hospital, Officer Steinfeldt advised the appellant that he was
under arrest and said that he would like to take one of three
tests to determine the appellant's intoxication, and recommended a blood test ( R. 21 7) . Officer Steinfeldt testified
(R. 216):
"In further talking to the defendant I believe I asked him if he had
been drinking. To this question I received an affirmative answer.
Oh yes, I think I also told him that in circumstances such as this
that we usually ask for a person that had been driving a car and
had been drinking to submit to one of three tests for the purpose of
finding out if he was driving the vehicle under the influence of
alcohol; that one of those three tests could determine if he was
over the specific amount of .150. I think I also asked him if he
understood the process that I was explaining to him. He saidyes, that he did understand what I was talking to him about. I
told him that I was placing him under arrest, that he had the
choice of a blood analysis, a urine analysis, or a breathilyzer test,
and that I would like to suggest the blood analysis because we
were at the hospital. This is where we obtain this and it would be
most expedient to have it. I asked him if he would take one of
those- specifically, the one that I had suggested. He said he
would."

Thereafter, Officer Steinfeldt had a nurse or social worker
come over and verify the appellant's willingness to submit
to a blood test. He testified ( R. 218) :
"I took the vial back and stood by the defendant and called either
one of the nurses' aides or social workers. Now I do not know
which the terminology of the woman down there is. She is an
assistant down there.

* * *
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"I asked her to come over with the paper and to witness the asking
of the defendant if he would submit to a blood test. She came
over. I asked the defendant if he would submit to a blood test
that I wished to draw a sample from him, or have a sample fro~
him and he said, 'Yes.' The witness signed the paper, I also signed
the paper. There is a special form down there that they have."

At the time Officer Steinfeldt had the appellant submit
to a blood test, he did not know that the passengers of the
appellant's vehicle were dead (R. 238). It was Officer
Steinfeldt's opinion when he saw the appellant at the accident scene and at the hospital that the appellant was drunk
( R. 239, 24 7). On cross examination, Officer Steinfeldt
indicated that he thoroughly advised the appellant of the
nature of the request for a blood test and the consequences
of his refusal to take such a test ( R. 249) . He further adhered to his position that the nurse or assistant had also
obtained a consent from the appellant (R. 252).
Officer Donald R. Fox testified that while at the hospital, the attending physician asked the appellant if he
would submit to a blood test. He testified (R. 273):

l~

"The Doctor asked Mr. Bryan if he would submit to the blood
alcohol test and Mr. Bryan said, 'Yes.' "

The testimony of Dr. Richard S. Joseph was read into
evidence as it was received at the time of the preliminary
hearing (R. 271). Dr. Joseph testified that when he examined the appellant, he was alert and showed no signs of
any "neurological disorder" and that he withdrew blood
from the appellant for the purposes of a blood alcohol test.
This apparently occurred after Officer Steinfeldt had obtained the appellant's consent. According to the Doctor,
the appellant did not object (R. 285) although his compliance was reluctant ( R. 295) .
A chemist from the office of the State Chemist testified
that the appellant's blood alcohol level was .24 7 per cent.
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Under the provisions of 41-6--44, a blood alcohol level of
.150 results in a presumption of intoxication. The trial court
allowed the evidence of the blood alcohol test to be received against the appellant.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN AL-

LOWING THE EVIDENCE RELATING TO THE APPELLANTS BLOOD ALCOHOL TEST TO BE RECEIVED IN
EYIDENCE BECAUSE IT WAS NOT SECURED AS A RESULT
OF ANY ILLEGAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE SINCE:
A. THE TEST WAS CONSENTED TO AS A MATTER OF

LAW.
B. THE TEST WAS CONSENTED TO AS A MATTER OF
FACT.
C. THE TEST WAS PROPERLY TAKEN INCIDENT TO
A VALID ARREST BECAUSE THE ARREST OF THE
ACCUSED WAS MADE UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES
(1) CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE, (2) STATUTORILY PERMISSIBLE.
D. THE SEARCH WAS PERMISSIBLE BECAUSE OF THE
NATURE OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES INVOLVED IN
THE INSTANT CASE AND HAVING BEEN MADE
UPON REASONABLE GROUNDS TO BELIEVE A
CRIME HAD BEEN COMMITTED .
.\. THE TEST WAS CONSENTED TO AS A MATTER OF LAW.

The appellant in this case has argued that the blood test
performed by law enforcement officials and members of the
State Chemist's Office should not have been admitted in
evidence because the blood, upon which the test was based,
was extracted from the appellant in violation of his constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Federal Constitution, prohibiting unlawful searches and
seizures. It is submitted that there is no merit to the apSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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pellant's position in that he consented as a matter of law
to having been given a blood test. 41-6-44.10, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, provides:
" (a) Any person operating a motor vehicle in this state shall
be deemed to have given his consent to a chemical test of his
breath, blood or urine for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his blood, provided that such test is administered
at the direction of a police officer having reasonable grounds to
believe such person to have been driving in an intoxicated condition and in accordance with the rules and regulations established
by the department."

In the instant case, the evidence disclosed the appellant
to have been operating his motor vehicle on the highways of
the State of Utah. The police officer, under whose direction
the blood test was administered, had reasonable grounds
upon which to believe that the appellant had been operating his vehicle while in an intoxicated condition. The obvious reasonable grounds are the accident, appellant's statement that he was drunk, the odor of his breath, the slurry
speech, and other factors indicative of intoxication. The
United States Supreme Court, in Zap v. The United States,
328 U.S. 624 ( 1946), upheld the inspection of an individual's books where there had been a contract between the
individual and the United States under a cost-plus-fixed-fee
contract and where both the statute and the contract provided for the inspection. In numerous other instances the
concept of an automatic waiver, pursuant to statute has
been recognized. In Varon, Searches, Seizures and Immunities, Vol. 1 ( 1961), page 228, it is stated:
"It becomes evident that an automatic waiver of this privilege
is either made in advance by the individual in exchange for a
license to do business, by way of contractual agreement, or by
operation of law in types of businesses that are coupled with a
public interest."
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In that work, the concept of automatic statutory waiver is
discussed and it is recognized as a valid basis upon which to
predicate a search.
In Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957), the
United States Supreme Court was concerned with whether
or not the extraction of blood from an unconscious motorist
violated the due process clause of the Federal Constitution.
It held that it did not. Although the court was not concerned with search and seizure as the exclusionary rule,
t\1 app v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 ( 1961), had not as yet been
announced; however, the court noted in Footnote 2, at page
451, of the opinion:
"It might be a fair assumption that a driver on the highways,
in obedience to a policy of the State, would consent to have a blood
test made as a part of a sensible and civilized system protecting
himself as well as other citizens not only from the hazards of the
road due to drunken driving, but also from some use of dubious
lay testimony. In fact, the State of Kansas has by statute declared
that any person who operates a motor vehicle on the public highways of that State shall be deemed to have given his consent to
submit to a chemical test of his breath, blood, urine, or saliva for
the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his blood. If,
after arrest for operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, the arresting officer has reasonable
grounds for the arrest, and the driver refuses to submit to the test,
the arresting officer must report this fact to the proper official who
shall suspend the operator's permit. Kan Gen Stat, 1949 (Supp
1955), § 8-1001 through§ 8-1007."

In the instant case, the police officer taking the test complied with the requirements of the statute and with the decisions of this court in Ringwood v. The State, 8 U.2d 287,
333 P.2d 943 ( 1959) and Bean v. The State, 12 U.2d 76,
362 P.2d 750 ( 1961) .1
1

1t is the position of the State that the statutory consent is to having any
one of the tests in the statute given and that the failure to offer a particular test
does not vitiate the statutory consent nor prohibit the use of the evidence
thereby obtained but that the failure to offer the three tests would prohibit the
revocation of a driver's license.
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Goff, Constitutionality of Compulsory Chemical Tests
to Determine Intoxication) 49 Journal of Criminal Law,
Criminology and Police Science ( 1958) , early discussed the
problems attendant to applying consent statutes. The author of that article notes, at page 65, with reference to implied consent statutes:

"* * * Indications are, however, that the courts will favor it
and, by so doing, will strengthen the statutes which prohibit driving while under the influence of alcohol."
Additionally, almost all states which have considered
the propriety of consent statutes similar to 41-6-44.10,
U.C.A. 1953, have upheld their constitutionality as against
challenges that the statute violated federal constitutional
rights. 88 A.L.R.2d 1064, 1068.
The concept of consent by statute, pursuant to the grant
of a privilege, is in no way contrary to constitutional principles. Manchester Press Club v. State Liquor Commission,
89 N.H. 442, 200 A. 407 (1938). As was noted in the
Breithaupt case, supra, the substantial interest of a state in
protecting the health, safety and welfare of its citizens on its
highways justifies such reasonable conditions on the privilege of driving. Reasonable conditions on privileges have
been recognized in many instances and it has been held reasonable as a condition precedent to entering upon a military installation that the individual consent to the search
of his person or motor vehicle. Judge Advocate General
Activities 1952/3135, 2 Dig. Ops., Search and S., § 11.5;
J.A.G.A. 1953/1738, 3 Dig. Ops., Search and S., § 11.1;
J.A.G.A. 1952/4398, 2 Dig. Ops., Mil. Pers., § 20.1;
J.A.G.A. 1952/8326, 3 Dig. Ops., Posts,§ 23.1.
Consequently, it is submitted that the plain language of
41-6-44.10, U.C.A. 1953, operated as a consent as a matter
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of law to the extraction of the appellant's blood for the purposes of a blood alcohol test. 2

B.

THE TEST WAS CONSENTED TO AS A MATTER OF FACT.

It is submitted that the appellant consented to the blood
test as a matter of actual fact. It is well settled that an
accused can consent to a search of his person. The Federal
Law on Search and Seizure, F.B.I., 1962, p. 70; johnson v.
Zcrbst, 304 U.S. 458 ( 1938). The appellant in the instant
case was thoroughly advised by the arresting sheriff of his
rights under the law. Although he was placed under arrest
by the officer, in accordance with the statutory mandate of
·H-6-44.10, he was not being subjected to any pressure of
any kind and was being given medical treatment by attending physicians. The officer requested the appellant's consent and the appellant freely gave it. Thereafter, to insure
that consent was properly obtained, the officer asked a
nurse's aide or attendant to verify the fact that the appellant had consented to the blood test. The nurse asked the
appellant if he did in fact consent and received a positive
reply. Finally, prior to the time the doctor made the extraction, he again asked the appellant if he consented to the
blood test. The doctor testified that although the appellant
was reluctant, he made no protest and his reluctance was
only a matter of his attitude towards the test and was not in
any way based upon a vocal protest or a belligerent attitude
of any kind. The doctor further indicated that the appellant
was in full possession of his faculties at the time the extraction was made.
2
In Opinion 62-058, the Attorney General ruled that 41-6-44.10 operated as an implied consent statute, allowing a blood test to be taken on an
unconscious individual where the officer has reasonable cause to believe the
individual has been operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol.
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The mere fact that an accused is under arrest at the time
he consents to a search of his person or property does not
prima facie make the search non-consentual. People v.
Rodriguez, 168 Cal. App. 2d 452, 336 P.2d 266 ( 1959);
People v. Faulkner, 166 Cal. App. 2d 446, 333 P.2d 251
( 1958) ; State v. Hoffman, 392 P.2d 237 (Wash. 1964).
The question of whether or not a particular person consents or does not consent to a search is a question of fact.
State v. H offman,supra; People v. Torres, 158 Cal. App. 2d
213, 322 P.2d 300 ( 1958) ; People v. Gorg, 45 Cal. 2d 776,
291 P.2d 469 ( 1955). Certainly, the facts in this instance
would support a determination that the search was consentual. The appellant was a mature individual, not being
subjected to any brutality, trickery or fraud, who was in
full possession of his faculties. In Davis, Federal Searches
and Seizures, p. 173 ( 1964), it is stated:

.-

"If officers clearly explain an individual's constitutional rights,
there is little doubt that the waiver is made intelligently."

In State v. Plas, 391 P.2d 867 (Nev. 1964), the Nevada
Supreme Court noted:
"Whether in a particular case an apparent consent to a search
without a warrant was voluntarily given is a question of fact. So
far as appears from the record the respondent, without any force
or coercion on the part of the officer who was questioning him,
freely consented to the search of his automobile which disclosed
the evidence he since has claimed was illegally obtained. In fact
respondent admits that no actual threat was made to induce the
consent. Under the facts of this case, a holding that as a matter of
law respondent's consent was given because of an unlawful assertion of authority by the officer would be unjustified. People v.
Burke, 47 Cal. 2d 45,301 P.2d 241.
"Although searches and seizures made without a proper warrant are often to be regarded as unreasonable and in violation of
the federal constitution, the obtaining of the warrant may be
waived by the individual; he may give his consent in the search
and seizure. Such waiver and consent, freely and intelligently
given, converts a search and seizure which otherwise would be
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unlawful into a lawful search and seizure. United States v.
\litrhell, 322 U.S. 65, 64 S.Ct. 896, 88 L.Ed. 1140; Brainard v.
United States, 95 U.S.App.D.C. 121,220 F.2d 384; Judd v. United
States, 89 U.S.App.D.C. 64, 190 F.2d 649. The mere fact that the
consent was given while respondent was in the custody of a police
officer does not render the consent involuntary. United States v.
\litrhell, supra."

This court recognized as much in State v. Louden, 15 U.2d
64, 387 P.2d 240 ( 1963). In State v. Tigue, 95 Ariz. 45,
386 P.2d 402 ( 1963), the Arizona Supreme Court upheld
a search where police officers stopped the appellant's car,
noted that his eyes appeared watery and bloodshot, and
that the driver of the vehicle smelled of alcohol. The officers
searched the accused and recovered evidence leading to the
accused's conviction. The Arizona Supreme Court noted,
at page404:
"The constitutional protection against unreasonable search
may be waiwd by unequivocal words or conduct expressing consent. People v. Sullivan, 214 A.C.A. 432, 29 Cal.Rptr. 515. Competent evidence in this case indicates that defendant Schipper invited a search. The officer who made the search testified:
"'I talked with him for awhile. We just visited and then
I asked him if he had anything on him that he shouldn't have,
and he told me no, he didn't- go ahead- and held his arms
up. And at that time I searched him and found the monies.'
(Emphasis supplied.)"

See also State v. Marshall, 380 P.2d 799 (Ore. 1963). In
that case the Oregon Supreme Court noted that proof of
wai\·er of constitutional protection from unreasonable
search and seizure need not be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt but need only be shown by clear and convincing evidence.
The evidence in the instant case, when viewed in light
of all the circumstances, including the accused's age, the
admonition of the officer and the inquiry of the nurse and
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doctor, support a conclusion that the consent to the blood
test was given as a matter of fact.

C.

THE TEST WAS PROPERLY TAKEN INCIDENT TO A
VALID ARREST BECAUSE THE ARREST OF THE ACCUSED
WAS MADE UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES
TIONALLY PERMISSIBLE,

(2)

(1)

CONSTITU-

STATUTORILY PERMIS-

SIBLE.

( 1) It is well settled that a search may be made incident
to a valid arrest. United States v. RabinowitzJ 339 U.S. 56
(1950); United States v. HarrisJ 331 U.S. 145 (1947);
Ker v. CaliforniaJ 374 U.S. 23 ( 1963); State v. Dodge, 12
Utah 2d 293, 365 P.2d 798 ( 1961). The appellant contends that the blood test taken in the instant case was improperly admitted because the officer arrested the accused
for a misdemeanor, to wit: driving while intoxicated, when
such a misdemeanor was not committed in the presence of
the arresting officer. 77-13-2, U.C.A. 1953, requires that
before an officer can arrest for a misdemeanor, the offense
must be committed or attempted in the presence of the
officer. Oleson v. PincockJ 68 Utah 507,251 Pac. 23 ( 1926).
However, the Court is concerned in this case not with the
validity of an arrest for false arrest purposes, but with
validity of an arrest for purposes of allowing evidence to be
received against the accused without violating constitutional rights. (The true question is whether or not an arrest
made on the basis of reasonable and probable cause to
believe a crime has been committed is constitutionally
proper in a misdemeanor case so that evidence so obtained
may be received. What standard is constitutionally applicable? In Leagre, The Fourth Amendment and The Law of
ArrestJ 54 Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and
Police Science 393, 406 ( 1963) it is stated:
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"Thus is is clear from both the search and arrest cases that the
Fourth Amendment applies the standard of probable cause to determine the validity of an arrest made without a warrant ..."

also Davis, Federal Searches and Seizures, Chapter 7
( 1964).
In Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 ( 1925) the
Supreme Court allowed a search made on probable cause
where the individual was engaged in the commission of a
misdemeanor, thus recognizing that police officers are held
to no higher standard of constitutional requirement in a
misdemeanor case than in a felony case. In Leagre, supra,
54 Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science 393, 405 ( 1963) notes:
Sec

"It would seem to follow a fortiori that the right to arrest without
warrant for lesser offences than felonies and breaches of the peace
is constitutionally permissible."

See also Foote, Safeguards in the Law of Arrest, 52 NW,
U.L. Rev. 16, 17-18 ( 1957).
Consequently, an arrest based on probable cause, although contrary to State law, would be constitutionally
unobjectionable and the evidence obtained from such an
arrest would be admissible. United States v. Snyder, 278
Fed. 650 ( 1922); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582
( 1946). If the arrest is constitutionally proper, the evidence obtained by search incident to such arrest is admissible. State l'. Dodge, supra. Is the fact that a state statute
may require a more severe standard for a legal arrest a
basis for excluding evidence where the arrest was constitutionally sound? It is submitted not, unless the state as a
matter of its own judicial policy chooses to apply an exclusionary rule under such circumstances. Utah does not apply
such a rule. Although recognizing itself bound to follow the
exclusionary rule by virtue of M app v. Ohio, supra, this
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court recognized in State v. Louden, supra, that prior Utah
cases had not adopted the exclusionary rule where state
policy was involved. State v. Aime, 62 Utah 476, 220 Pac.
704 ( 1923); State v. Fair, 10 Utah 2d 365, 353 P.2d 615
( 1960) . Therefore, the evidence in the instant case was
admissible since it was constitutionally obtained and Utah
does not as a matter of state policy apply the exclusionary
rule where federal constitutional issues are not involved. 3
( 2) It is submitted that the arrest in the instant case can
be sustained, and thereby the search incident thereto, on
the basis that the arrest was proper under statutes of this
state. In the instant case at the time the officers arrived
upon the scene, the accused was obviously intoxicated. As
he started to walk, he fell down and he told the officer that
he was drunk. Officer Pete Kutulas, one of the investigating
officers, indicated that the accused was committing the
offense of public intoxication (R. 80). It is immaterial that
the arrest for the offense which was committed in the officer's presence, to wit, public intoxication, was delayed until
the accused was taken to the hospital. Dailey v. United
States, 261 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. den. 359 U.S.
969; Carlo v. United States, 286 F.2d 841 (2nd Cir. 1961),
cert. den. 336 U.S. 944; Davis, Federal Searches and Seizures, ( 1964) § 3.231. Therefore, the officers, at the time
they first observed the accused, observed him committing
an offense in their presence. 32-7-13, Utah Code Annotated 1953, makes it a misdemeanor for a person to "be in
an intoxicated condition in a public place." The appellant
was in an intoxicated condition, sitting on the curbing in
the vicinity of 39th South and State Streets in Salt Lake
County. Officer Steinfeldt testified that he arrested the
3
Assuming for arguments sake that the evidence is not otherwise admissible
vis a vis consent, or incident to a lawful arrest under State law, etc.
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accused in the hospital for the offense of driving while intoxicated. The fact that the officer arrests an individual for
one offense does not necessarily vitiate the arrest if he otherwisc had sufficient grounds to arrest for another offense.
Thus, in State v. Tigue, 95 Ariz. 45, 386 P.2d 402 ( 1963),
the Arizona court stated:
"* * * Nevertheless, the test regarding the legality of a search
and seizure is whether it was 'reasonable' under the circumstances,
and the courts have held that circumstances beyond the fact that
there was an arrest might justify a search and seizure which otherwise would be unreasonable."

Implicit, therefore, in the Arizona court's opinion, is the
concept that all the facts available to the officers must be
looked at to determine whether their conduct was reasonable. The fact that the officers mislabeled the particular
offense for which the arrest was made is immaterial.
Secondly, it is submitted that in the case of driving in
an intoxicated condition, the police officers may arrest, even
though the offense is not committed in their presence and is
a mere misdemeanor, if they have reasonable grounds to
believe the person has in fact been driving in an intoxicated
condition. 41-6-44.10, Utah Code Annotated 1953, provides that a blood alcohol test may be taken if the police
officer has reasonable grounds to "believe such person has
been driving in an intoxicated condition." The statute further provides that if the individual is placed under arrest
and has been requested to submit to "any one of the above"
tests and refuses, it shall not be given. The statute seems to
contemplate that at the time the officer requests the accused
to submit to a blood test, the accused will be under arrest.
Since the statute allows the blood test to be taken on reasonable grounds, it follows that the statute contemplates that
the arrest will be made upon the showing of reasonable
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grounds. As noted above, there is nothing unconstitutional
about allowing an arrest for a misdemeanor on the basis of
reasonable grounds to believe the offense has been committed. The Legislature, obviously aware of the problem of
the drunk driver, intended to authorize an arrest for driving
while intoxicated under circumstances more liberal than
in the case of other misdemeanors. The officer in the instant
case complied completely with the provisions of the statute.
This being so, the arrest was proper and the search incident
thereto appropriate. In People v. Duroncelay, 48 Cal. 2d
766, 312 P.2d 690 ( 1957), the California Supreme Court
upheld the extraction of blood from an accused after he was
taken to the hospital following an automobile accident. The
accused was charged with drunk driving causing personal
injury. The California Supreme Court stated:
"It is obvious from the evidence that, before the blood sample
was taken at the request of the highway patrolman, there was reasonable cause to believe that defendant had committed the felony
of which he was convicted, and he could have been lawfully arrested at that time."

The facts in the instant case are similar to those in the
Duroncelay case, where the California Supreme Court
found reasonable grounds for the arrest. The officer in the
instant case also having reasonable grounds, the arrest and
search were proper.

D.

THE SEARCH WAS PERMISSIBLE BECAUSE OF THE
NATURE OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES INVOLVED IN THE
INSTANT CASE AND HAVING BEEN MADE UPON REASONABLE GROUNDS TO BELIEVE A CRIME HAD BEEN
COMMITTED.

In Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 ( 1925) the
United States Supreme Court recognized an exception to
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the general rule that searches must be predicated on warrants or incident to arrest. The basis of the court's decision
in that case is the acknowledgment that automobiles and
motor vehicles are so mobile that special considerations
warrant the application of a different rule. In Davis, Federal Searches and Seizures, Section 5.0 ( 1964) it is stated:
"The search of conveyances is an exception to the general requirl'ment that searches be conducted under the authority of a
warrant. The right to search extends to vessels, vehicles and aircraft; however, its greatest application is to automobiles. It is not
surprising, therefore, that the increasing use of automobiles and
their adaptability for violating the National Prohibition Act, resulted in the leading case of Carroll v. United States, 1925, 267
U.S. 192, ·15 S.Ct. 280,69 L.Ed. 543.
"The basis for the rule that conveyances may be searched
without a warrant is their capacity for being quickly moved from
one locality to another. This element of mobility makes it impracticable, if not impossible, to obtain a search warrant in most
instances. In this respect, it must be remembered that a warrant
may be required if the element of mobility is no longer present."

See also 1 Harvard journal on Legislation, 51,55 (1964).
In The Federal Law on Search and Seizure, F.B.I., 1962,
p. 187, it is stated:
"The Federal law allows search of a vehicle in a mobile condition on probable cause to believe that it contains something subject to seizure and destruction. Carroll v. U.S., 267 U.S. 132
( 1925) . Where such probable cause exists, a vehicle in a mobile
condition may be searched without a search warrant, an arrest or
a consent. In this respect, searches of vehicles are unique in the
Federal law of search and seizure."

Although the Carroll case seemed to have been rejected
in United States v. DiRe, 332 U.S. 581 ( 1947), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the Carroll case in Brinegar v. the
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 149 and the Carroll decision
may be clearly recognized as the law in the United States
today. Reav. DnitedStates,255,F.2d473 (4thCir.l958).
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United States v. One 1957 Ford Ranchero Pickup Truck,
265 F.2d 21 (lOth Cir. 1959). Davis, supra, p. 219, 222.
Speaking of the Carroll case, in Leagre, The Fourth
Amendment and The Law of Arrest, 54 Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science 393 ( 1963) at
p. 399, it is stated:

"* * * The first of these exceptions is found

in Carroll v. United
which recognized the necessity for dispensing with the
requirement of a warrant when moving vehicles were involved.
The Court realized that insisting upon the requirement of a warrant in these circumstances would afford ample opportunity for
the owner to remove his suspect automobile prior to the time the
officers were authorized to search. This exception from the requirement of a warrant was thus grounded on a showing of absolute necessity on the facts of the particular case."

States~

The State submits that the instant situation presents a
set of factual circumstances warranting the application of a
doctrine similar to that in Carroll v. United States. In the
instant case, at the time the officers arrived on the scene,
they had reasonable grounds to believe a crime had been
committed. However, humanitarian considerations warranted swift action and warranted action other than the
obtaining of a search warrant. First, the in jured passengers
in the appellant's vehicle needed medical attention. Second, the vehicles involved in the accident required removal
and the normal flow of passage on the very busy street
(State Street) had to be kept moving. Third, the appellant
himself was in need of medical treatment. Fourth, the blood
alcohol level varies in an individual case with time. The
time necessary to procure a search warrant could have resulted in additional absorption or dillution thus impeaching
the validity of any blood alcohol test. A fortiori it was necessary that the officers not stop to obtain a warrant under the
circumstances. The conditions under which the blood alco-
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hol test was taken were reasonable, and consequently in
accord with constitutional requirements. United States v.
Rabinowitz, supra. In the instant case there was an "absolute necessity" based upon "the facts of the particular case
which necessitated action and dispensed with need for a
search warrant." It is incongruous to argue that the officers
should have taken the time to obtain a search warrant and
thus neglect the appellant and passengers who were badly
injured and at the same time to say that if they acted to save
the lives of the passengers of appellant's vehicle and to
render appropriate medical assistance to appellant that
they are somehow precluded from obtaining the evidence
revealed by blood alcohol tests. The extraction and test
in the instant case were made at the most opportune time
when the facts and exigencies of the case allowed. 4 Consequently, the search was reasonable and the Constitution demands nothing else. State v. Louden, supra. The facts of
this case should be deemed to allow an appropriate application of the Carroll rule.
CONCLUSION
The appellant has challenged the admissibility of the
results of a blood alcohol test performed on his blood on the
grounds that the admission of such results violated his constitutional right to be free from unwarranted search and
• In opinion 62-058, the Attorney General stated that the rule in the Carroll case may well be applicable to the exigencies raised in the case of a blood
alcohol test where the motorist or his passengers are injured. The Attorney
General stated:
"* * * It would seem the same rule should be applicable in the case of alcohol tests on motorists since alcohol concentration decreases with the passage of time, and often the necessity for immediate medical attention is
present. Therefore, it would appear that the extraction of blood samples
or other body fluids would be permissible if done when the officer has reasonable belief of a crime being or having been committed. However, the
test should be performed as soon as possible. * * *"
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seizure. However, an analysis of the facts and the applicable legal principles demonstrate that there are numerous
legal bases which refute the claim of an unreasonable search
in this case. This court should affirm the conviction.
Respectfully submitted,
A. PRATT KESLER
Attorney General

RONALD N. BOYCE
Chief Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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